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BANKRUPTCY: WHERE ATTORNEYS CAN
LOSE BIG EVEN IF THEY WIN BIG
ABSTRACT
Historically, bankruptcy attorneys received the short end of the stick and
were paid less for their services than attorneys in other fields of law. With
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress attempted to reduce the
discrepancy in compensation. However, after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Baker Botts v. ASARCO, L.L.C., the playing field remains unequal for
bankruptcy attorneys. Following this decision, if a debtor disputes their
attorney’s fee application, attorneys are at a disadvantage and cannot
recover fees for defending their fee application. As a result, bankruptcy
attorneys take an effective pay cut if they are faced with a fee application
dispute, because they must either settle or litigate. Without adequate
safeguards in place, the Supreme Court has left bankruptcy attorneys
defenseless. This Note argues that creating a higher standard for disputing
fee applications, one involving the United States Trustee’s Office more,
would protect bankruptcy attorneys from prejudicial treatment and fix the
unfair situation they are currently placed in.
INTRODUCTION
Attorneys, like all professionals, expect to get paid for their work.
Attorneys are compensated a number of different ways—for example, on a
contingency basis, statutory basis, or on an hourly or flat rate basis.1 Attorney
compensation varies across different fields of law as well. Historically,
bankruptcy attorneys would receive the short end of the stick and would not
receive reasonable compensation for their services.2 With the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress intended to compensate
bankruptcy attorneys similarly to attorneys in other fields.3
In a bankruptcy proceeding, professionals employed by the debtor—
including attorneys—are compensated using the statutory framework

1. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1) (2012); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2013).
2. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 328.02 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1996); see
also ASARCO L.L.C. v. Barclays Capital, Inc., 702 F.3d 250, 258 (5th Cir. 2012) (section 328(a)
attempts to define compensation at the beginning of a professional’s engagement, and “eliminate
the previous uncertainty associated with professional compensation in bankruptcy proceedings,
even at the risk of potentially underpaying, or, conversely, providing a windfall to, professionals
retained by the estate.”).
3. See 124 CONG. REC. 33,994 (1978) (“[T]he policy of this Section is to compensate attorneys
and other professionals serving in a case under title [11] at the same rate as the attorney or other
professional would be compensated for performing comparable services other than in a case under
title [11].”); see also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 986 F.2d 207, 209 (7th Cir. 1993) (“In [Section] 330
and its legislative history Congress expressed its intent that compensation in bankruptcy matters be
commensurate with the fees awarded for comparable services in non- bankruptcy cases.”).
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provided in Sections 330 and 328 of the Bankruptcy Code.4 However,
determining what constitutes reasonable compensation for a bankruptcy
attorney, as well as the possible adjustments to that compensation (i.e., fee
enhancements), has resulted in much debate when dealing with Section 330.
Unlike attorneys in other fields, bankruptcy attorneys are required to
prepare “fee applications” for review by the parties, the court, and the United
States Trustee, in order to receive compensation from the debtor’s estate.5
Attorneys’ fees are classified as an administrative expense and receive
priority in a bankruptcy proceeding, right after secured claims, domestic
support obligations, and inadequate protection claims.6 The fees are subject
to reduction if the court or trustee believes them to be excessive and to not
meet the statutory requirements of “reasonable” and “actual and necessary.”
These terms are not congressionally defined and, instead, have been
judicially interpreted by case law.7
Any party involved may challenge an attorney’s fee application, which
forces the attorney to either concede and receive a reduction in fees, or incur
costs to defend the fee application. Courts were previously split as to whether
the attorney may be compensated for expenses incurred during the defense
of a fee application.8 On June 15, 2015, in Baker Botts v. ASARCO LLC,9 the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of compensation for fee application
defenses and decided to prohibit the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees in such
circumstances.10 As a result, debtors are armed with an advantage when
negotiating for a reduction in attorneys’ fees, leaving attorneys without
proper protections. Justice Breyer’s dissent in Baker Botts presented an
example: “Consider a bankruptcy attorney who earns $50,000—a fee that
reflects her hours, rates, and expertise—but is forced to spend $20,000
defending her fee application against meritless objections.”11 As a result, if
the bankruptcy court decides not to reimburse the $20,000 incurred for
defending the fee application, the attorney is effectively paid only $30,000,
which makes the $50,000 initial award artificial and insufficient.
This Note addresses the issues attorneys face with their fee applications
subsequent to the Supreme Court’s Baker Botts decision. Part I briefly
reviews the history of compensation in bankruptcy and explains Section 330
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 328 (2012) (section 328 governs only compensation where there
was a prior agreement including a retainer or an hourly rate.); see Caleb J. Bartel, Professional
Compensation in Bankruptcy: Using Contract Law Principles to Interpret Ambiguous Retention
Orders, 9 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 149, 177 (2007).
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a).
6. See id. § 507.
7. See id. § 330(a)(1)–(4).
8. Compare Boyd v. Engman, 404 B.R. 467, 488 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (allowing compensation
for fee defense), with Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P. (In re Frazin), 413 B.R. 378, 437–38
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (disallowing compensation for fee defense).
9. See generally Baker Botts L.L.P. v ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
10. See id.
11. Id. at 2170 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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of the Bankruptcy Code. Part II examines the “American Rule,” which was
essential to the Court’s decision, and points out the problems when applying
that rule to cases defending fee applications. Part III analyzes the Court’s
Baker Botts decision and its negative implications for the bankruptcy system.
Part IV provides possible amendments to Section 330 and proposes judicial
solutions that would protect attorneys from frivolous fee-defense litigation,
by stipulating certain standards a debtor must meet before challenging a fee
application.
I. THE COMPENSATION SCHEME IN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS
Before 1978, bankruptcy professionals were compensated “on a strictly
quantum meruit basis.”12 Quantum meruit is defined as: “[t]he reasonable
value of services; damages awarded in an amount considered reasonable to
compensate a person who has rendered services in a quasi-contractual
relationship[;]” or “[a] claim or right of action for the reasonable value of
services rendered.”13 However, bankruptcy attorneys were historically
compensated on the “lower end of the spectrum of reasonableness.”14 The
courts explained that “[s]ince attorneys assisting the trustee in the
administration of a bankruptcy estate are acting not as private persons but as
officers of the court, they should not expect to be compensated as generously
for their services as they might be were they privately employed.”15
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in an attempt to
reform the bankruptcy system and, in the process, Congress readjusted how
bankruptcy professionals were compensated.16 Congress explained that since
professionals would earn less in bankruptcy than in other fields, it would
result in a lack of bankruptcy professionals, because they would leave
bankruptcy to enter into more profitable fields.17 Congress sought to prevent
attorney attrition from the bankruptcy practice and, as a result, overruled
prior justifications, such as conservation of the estate and economy of
administration, when determining compensation. Thus, Congress allowed
bankruptcy professionals to be compensated comparably to professionals in
other fields.18

12. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2.
13. Quantum meruit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
14. See Am. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Baddock (In re First Colonial Corp. of Am.), 544 F.2d

1291, 1289–99 (5th Cir. 1977), superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
15. Id.; see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 405 F.2d 429, 432–33 (5th Cir. 1968)
(holding that the interest of the public—especially the debtor and creditors—could limit
compensation to a debtor’s counsel), superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2012).
16. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2.
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 598, at 329–30 (1977); see also S. REP. NO. 989, at 40–41 (1978).
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 598; S. REP. NO. 989.
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There are four Bankruptcy Code provisions that regulate the employment
and compensation of professionals.19 Section 327 authorizes the trustee to
“retain or replace” professionals.20 Section 328 authorizes employment of a
professional on reasonable terms and conditions including: “on a retainer, on
an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee
basis.”21 This Section provides a professional with a sense of certainty due to
the pre-approved fee.22 Section 330, subject to Sections 326, 328, and 329,
allows for “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services” and
“reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.”23 Lastly, Section 331 allows
a court to grant interim compensation or reimbursements.24 An analysis of
Section 330 will show that the Supreme Court erred in their decision in Baker
Botts.
A. “REASONABLENESS” UNDER SECTION 330
In 1976, prior to reforming the Bankruptcy Code, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act (CRAFAA), which authorized
district courts to grant attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in civil rights
litigation.25 CRAFAA contained a reasonableness test that was adopted from
the Fifth Circuit decision, Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.26 In a
later case, while struggling to define “reasonable” during a bankruptcy
proceeding, the Fifth Circuit applied the factors from Johnson and
CRAFAA.27 Courts continued to use the Johnson and CRAFAA factors, even
after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.28 Further, with the 1984
amendments, the legislature and the courts define reasonable compensation
under Section 330(a)(1) as: “the nature, the extent, and the value of such

19.
20.
21.
22.

See Bartel, supra note 4, at 153.
11 U.S.C. § 327(b).
Id. § 328(a).
See Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. (In re Nat’l Gypsum Co.),
123 F.3d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1); see COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, § 330.01.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 331.
25. See generally Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 1, 90
Stat. 2641, 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)).
26. See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974) (providing
the factors for the reasonableness test which are: (1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) preclusion of
other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) customary fee; (6) whether the
fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or other circumstances; (8)
amount involved and the results obtained; (9) experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
(10) undesirability of the case; (11) nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
and (12) awards in similar cases).
27. See Am. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Baddock (In re First Colonial Corp. of Am.), 544 F.2d
1291, 1298–99 (5th Cir. 1977).
28. See, e.g., In re Lloyd, Carr & Co., 2 B.R. 714, 716–17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979); In re Arlan’s
Dept. Stores, Inc., 462 F. Supp. 1255, 1260–61 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying First Colonial).
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services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services
other than in a case under this title.”29
In a 1983 civil rights case, Hensley v. Eckerhart,30 the Supreme Court
implemented the “lodestar method.”31 The Third Circuit in Lindy Brothers
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.32
summarized the lodestar method:
In discussing the proper standards which would govern the award of fees in
a case of this sort, . . . the first inquiry of the Court should be into the hours
spent by the attorneys, including how many hours were spent in what
manner by which attorneys. After determining the time spent, the district
court should then undertake to fix an hourly rate of compensation
to be applied to the hours worked. While the amount thus found to
constitute reasonable compensation should be the “lodestar” of the Court’s
fee determination, at least two other factors should be taken into account in
computing the value of attorneys’ services, namely the contingent nature of
success and the extent, if any, to which the quality of an attorney’s work
mandates either increasing or decreasing the amount to which the Court has
found the attorney reasonably entitled. 33

In addition, the figure arrived at using the lodestar method is subject to
modification: the Supreme Court warned that the calculation was merely an
“initial estimate,” and that “other considerations” may lead courts to “adjust
the fee upward or downward,” depending on the “results obtained.”34 The
Supreme Court’s adoption of the lodestar method did not eliminate the
CRAFAA factors, but instead merged the two methods.35 Thereafter,
bankruptcy courts used the lodestar method to calculate fees, and adjusted
the fees upward or downward after considering the CRAFAA factors.36

29. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 433, 98
Stat. 333, 370 (1984) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2012)) (emphasis added).
30. See generally Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
31. Id. (“[T]he most useful starting point for [court determination of] the amount of a reasonable
fee [payable by the losing party] is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation
multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”).
32. See generally Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976).
33. Id. at 108 (citing Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 382
F. Supp. 999, 1003 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (internal citations omitted)).
34. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564–65 (1986).
“[T]he rare case where the fee applicant offer[ed] specific evidence to show that the quality of
service rendered was superior to that one reasonably would expect in light of the hourly rates
charged and that the success was ‘exceptional.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
899 (1984)).
35. See id. at 564–65 (“We there adopted a hybrid approach that shared elements of both
Johnson and the lodestar method of calculation.”).
36. See, e.g., Transamerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Zapata P’ship, Ltd. (In re Fender), 12 F.3d 480,
487 (5th Cir. 1994); In re El Paso Refinery, Inc., 257 B.R. 809, 828–29 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000);
In re Pub. Serv. Co., 160 B.R. 404, 420 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993).
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In 1994, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 and
amended Section 330(a)(3) to add a non-exhaustive list of factors, including
some of the Johnson factors, to aid courts in assessing the reasonableness of
fees.37 Additionally, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 added Section
330(a)(4)(A), which placed limitations on certain fees.38 Also, Congress
specifically allowed for professionals to be “awarded [fees] for the
preparation of a fee application” under Section 330(a)(6).39 It appears that
Congress intended to impose the holdings of In re Nucorp Energy40 and In re
Manoa Finance41 to reimburse bankruptcy attorneys for actions that their
non-bankruptcy counterparts do not undertake, such as filling out a detailed
fee application.42 The fee for preparing the application has typically been
limited to no more than five percent of the total fees and expenses requested.43
When applying adjustments, courts continue to use the lodestar method when
they deem necessary.44
B. ACTUAL AND NECESSARY SERVICES
1. Actual and Necessary
Section 330(a)(1) allows for the reimbursement of fees and expenses if
they meet the “actual” and “necessary” standards.45 The terms “actual” and
“necessary” have been defined by case law. For example, the Fifth Circuit
defined “actual” and “necessary” in its decision in In re Pro-Snax,46 and
proposed a tougher requirement than stated in the statute.47 In In re Pro-Snax,
the debtor’s attorney was seeking to be compensated from the estate for work
performed after the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee.48
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (2012) (“In determining the amount of reasonable compensation
to be awarded . . . the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services,
taking into account all relevant factors.”).
38. See id. § 330(a)(4)(A) (Not allowing compensation for: “unnecessary duplication of
services” or “services that were not—reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate; or necessary
to the administration of the case.”).
39. Id. §330(a)(6).
40. See generally In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655, 658–59 (9th Cir. 1985).
41. See generally In re Manoa Fin. Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1988).
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 330; see also In re Manoa, 853 F.2d at 692; In re Nucorp, 764 F.2d at 658–
59.
43. See, e.g., In re New Bos. Coke Corp., 299 B.R. 432, 446 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (“Time
spent generating fee applications is generally limited to 5% of the total fees requested.”); see also
In re Bass, 227 B.R. 103, 109 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1998) (“Absent exceptional circumstances, fees
for the preparation of fee applications should be limited to 5% of the total fees requested.”); In re
Heck’s, Inc., 112 B.R. 775, 793 (Bankr. S.D.W.Va. 1990) (imposing a 3% cap).
44. See e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 554–56 (2010); In re Se. Banking Corp., 314
B.R. 250, 269–70 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1).
46. See generally Andrews & Kurth L.L.P. v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re Pro-Snax Distrib., Inc.),
157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 425.
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The court in Pro-Snax upheld the “hindsight approach,” which as the
name suggests, only looks to the time at which the services were rendered
and whether an attorney’s services resulted in an “identifiable, tangible, and
material benefit to the [bankruptcy] estate.”49 Essentially, courts must
evaluate attorneys’ fees with a two-step analysis: “[f]irst, the court must
determine, under § 330(a)(1)(A), whether an attorney’s services were ‘actual’
and ‘necessary,’”50 and hence compensable; second, the court must determine
whether the services “result in an identifiable, tangible, and material benefit
to the estate.”51 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that “the chances of success
must outweigh the costs of pursuing the action.”52 However, as the cliché
goes, hindsight is always twenty-twenty. The Fifth Circuit held that the
debtor’s attorney could only recover for work that resulted in a “material
benefit to the estate,” and significantly cut the attorney’s fees.53
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit overruled Pro-Snax with its decision in Barron
& Newburger, P.C. v. Tex Skyline, Ltd.54 The court acknowledged that “[i]n
light of the plain language of 330(a)(4)(A) after the 1994 amendments, the
Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have rejected the actual-benefit test [or
hindsight approach] in favor of a prospective standard.”55
The court held that the proper standard for determining what fees
attorneys are entitled to is the “hybrid approach,” which looks at the
“prospective, reasonable at the time” standard.56 This “hybrid approach”
includes both the prospective and hindsight views of the effects of the
services.57 The court explained that the standard set in Section 330 is “one
that looks to the necessity or reasonableness of legal services at the time they
were rendered.”58 Therefore, “if a fee applicant establishes that its services
were ‘necessary to the administration’ of a bankruptcy case or ‘reasonably
likely to benefit’ the bankruptcy estate ‘at the time at which [they were]
rendered,’ then the services are compensable.”59
Although the court overruled the method adopted in In re Pro-Snax, the
court was careful to note that the decision “is not intended to limit courts’
broad discretion to award or curtail attorney’s fees under § 330.”60 The Fifth

49. Id. at 426.
50. Kaye v. Hughes & Luce L.L.P., No. 3:06-CV-01863-B, 2007 WL 2059724, at *9 (N.D. Tex.

July 13, 2007).
51. Id. (quoting In re Pro-Snax, 157 F.3d at 426).
52. In re Pro-Snax, 157 F.3d at 426.
53. See id. (reduced debtor attorney’s fees by more than 30%).
54. See generally Barron & Newburger, P.C. v. Texas Skyline, Ltd. (In re Woerner), 783 F.3d
266, 277 (5th Cir. 2015).
55. Id. at 275.
56. Id. at 277.
57. In re Spillman Dev. Grp. Ltd., 376 B.R. 543, 550 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
58. In re Woerner, 783 F.3d at 276.
59. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
60. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
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Circuit’s new standard for interpreting “actual” and “necessary” is
synthesized as:
A bankruptcy court’s analysis of attorney fee awards ordinarily should
begin and end by applying the statutory language in 11 U.S.C. § 330. This
analysis usually can be reduced as follows: (1) a court is permitted, but not
required, to award fees under § 330 for services that could reasonably be
expected to provide an identifiable, material benefit to the estate at the time
those services were performed (or contributed to the administration of the
estate); and (2) courts may consider all other relevant equitable factors, as
stated in § 330(a)(3), including as one of those factors, when appropriate,
whether a professional service contributes to a successful outcome
[meaning, an enhancement of fees.]. 61

2. Services
Section 330 requires the fee to have been a “service” to the estate. When
the Supreme Court in Baker Botts determined that fee-defense work should
not be reimbursed, the Court argued that such work is not a “service” to the
estate as required under Section 330.62 However, the Supreme Court attained
their definition of “service” through outdated precedent and dictionaries
instead of recent case law from the relevant circuit court.
The Fifth Circuit explained “service”:
In assessing the likelihood that legal services would benefit the estate,
courts adhering to a prospective standard ordinarily consider, among other
factors, the probability of success at the time the services were rendered, the
reasonable costs of pursuing the action, what services a reasonable lawyer
or legal firm would have performed in the same circumstances, whether the
attorney’s services could have been rendered by the Trustee and his or her
staff, and any potential benefits to the estate (rather than to the individual
debtor).63

Contrary to the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit emphasized any benefit
to the estate, which presumably would include, as Justice Breyer explained
in his Baker Botts dissent, any underlying benefit the estate received.64
However, instead of using recent case law, the Supreme Court used precedent
addressing Section 330(a)’s predecessor.65 The precedent the Court used
referred to a Bankruptcy Code that was solely concerned with preserving the
estate, and not the current Bankruptcy Code that is concerned with
61. Id. at 278 (Jolly, J., concurring).
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2012); see also Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S.

Ct. 2158, 2161 (2015) (“[T]he phrase ‘reasonable compensation for services rendered’ necessarily
implies loyal and disinterested service in the interest of a client.”).
63. In re Woerner, 783 F.3d at 276 (emphasis added).
64. See id.; see also Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2169 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65. See Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2165 (citing Woods v. City Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 312
U.S. 262, 268 (1941); accord Am. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, Fla., 311 U.S.
138, 147 (1940)).

2016]

Where Attorneys Can Lose Big Even If They Win Big

265

compensating bankruptcy attorneys similarly to the way they would be
compensated in other fields.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court used dictionaries to define the term
“service.” 66 Between 1958 and 1983, “the Court cited dictionaries only 125
times – an average of five times per Term. Prior to 1980, in fact, the word
‘dictionary’ never appeared more than fifteen times in a single volume of the
Supreme Court Reporter.”67 Throughout the years, “[t]heorists of statutory
interpretation . . . explained the use of dictionaries as a ‘nice’ way to identify
permissible meanings. By contrast, the Court in recent cases has frequently
employed dictionaries as the focal point of the interpretive inquiry and
relegated arguments about policy, history, or structure to a secondary role.”68
Further, the Court began using “dictionary definitions [as] the primary
determinant of the ultimate outcome [in each case].”69
The use of dictionaries has been heavily criticized. The Court’s use of
dictionaries creates issues of statutory interpretation and linguistics. 70
Additionally, “[a] 1988 survey of the lexicographic staffs of five publishers
concluded that ‘the “polite press,” with The New York Times at its pinnacle’
is ‘the single most powerful influence in constituting the record of the English
lexicon.’”71 Therefore, citing a dictionary has the association of citing The
New York Times, and should not have definitive legal impact on a case.
Dictionaries struggle to capture statutory context:
One of the most significant flaws of dictionaries as interpretive tools is the
imperfect relationship of dictionaries to statutory context. The essence of
words can never be described fully in the absence of contextual cues; in
fact, many theorists have argued that meaning, as we understand it, does not
exist without context. Consequently, no dictionary can completely capture
the particular historical and textual framework of a statutory term. Nor does
any dictionary claim to do so. According to Hart and Sacks’s Legal Process
materials, dictionaries, like canons of construction, “simply answer the
question whether a particular meaning is linguistically permissible, if the
context warrants it.” Dictionaries are only starting points, organized
according to rough analogies and dependent on evidence that “the context
warrants” application of their definitions. 72
66. See id. at 2165 (citing Service, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.
1934) (“labor performed for another”); Service, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“duty
or labor to be rendered by one person to another”); Service, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933)
(“action of serving, helping, or benefitting; conduct tending to the welfare or advantage of another”).
67. Kevin Werbach, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1437, 1438 (1994).
68. Id. at 1439–40.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 1449.
71. Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/14bar.html?_r=0.
72. Werbach, supra note 67, at 1449–50; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1990) (“Because of the context, words sometimes have a meaning quite
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Therefore, the Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries to define the term
“service” is unfounded and, instead, the Court should have used the Fifth
Circuit’s and Justice Breyer’s definition of “service” as anything that
provides an “underlying benefit” to the estate.
As a result, the Supreme Court removed the possibility of an attorney
recovering fees for defending his or her fee application, by asserting that the
act of defending a fee application is not a “service” to the estate. It did this
simply through dictionary definitions of the term, while ignoring relevant
case law. However, the Court does not consider that the initial reason there
is a fee application is because of the services rendered by the attorney. Thus,
any legal work performed in relation to a fee application should be considered
a “service” to the estate, because that is what the fee application represents.
3. Summary
If the attorneys’ fees are “reasonable,” “actual,” and “necessary” at the
time the “service” is completed for the estate, then the fees are acceptable
under Section 330. The issue becomes whether the fees incurred for
defending a fee application and fee enhancements, which were initially fees
granted for the services conducted for the debtor, are still considered a service
to the estate. If we accept the argument of the Supreme Court, and do not
consider the defense of a fee application a “service,” this would leave the
attorney to hold the bill, even if he or she successfully defends the
application. Moreover, legislative intent requires bankruptcy practitioners to
be subject to the same scrutiny as non-bankruptcy practitioners when
compensated for their work.73 Non-bankruptcy practitioners do not have to
create fee applications, they are reimbursed for whatever costs they incur
from their client.
C. ENHANCEMENT OF FEES
Fee enhancements are not defined in Section 330; they are defined
merely by case law.74 After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hensley v.
Eckerhart, Blum v. Stenson,75 and Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’
Counsel for Clean Air,76 it was possible for bankruptcy courts to award

different from what might be found in Webster’s or the Oxford English Dictionary. Courts do not
and should not ‘make a fortress out of the dictionary.’”); see also William T. Mayton, Law Among
the Pleonasms: The Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation,
41 EMORY L.J. 113, 122 (1992) (“In statutory interpretation, then, the dictionary may be a starting
point, but it is the relation of the word to other words, by grammatical conventions, that does much
of the work of establishing meaning.”).
73. See H.R. REP. NO. 598, at 329–30 (1977).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012).
75. See generally Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984).
76. See generally Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Counsel for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546
(1986).
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enhanced fees for an attorney’s rare and exceptional work.77 The Supreme
Court held that:
only [the following] three rare and exceptional circumstances could justify
a fee enhancement based on superior performance: (1) when the hourly rate
employed in the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the
attorney’s true market value; (2) if the attorney’s performance includes an
extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is exceptionally
protracted; and (3) when there is an exceptional delay in the payment of
fees, [especially] where the delay is unjustifiably caused by the defense.78

For example, in a Florida bankruptcy proceeding where creditors were
expected to receive five cents on the dollar, the attorney displayed rare and
exceptional work when improving creditor reimbursement to 100 percent
payment to all creditors, as well as post-petition interest.79 The attorney
received a $1.6 million fee enhancement for such exceptional work.80
Seemingly, courts find “rare and exceptional” work when attorneys surpass
creditor recovery expectations.81
However, the extent to which fee enhancements are permissible became
unclear after the Supreme Court decided Perdue v. Kenny A.82 In Perdue, the
Court limited the ability of lower courts to enhance fees in civil rights cases
by suggesting that the “lodestar figure was reasonable” under Section
1988(b) and no fee enhancement was warranted.83 After Perdue, courts
continued to allow fee enhancements. The Fifth Circuit gave a detailed
analysis of fee enhancements in its opinion in In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.,
where the court allowed an additional $1 million fee enhancement over the
almost $6 million lodestar fee.84 In In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., CRG
Partners, L.L.P., the debtor’s attorney, helped complete a successful
restructuring, where the pre-petition shareholders expected to be left emptyhanded, but instead received $450 million in new equity interests.85 The Fifth
77. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); see also Del. Valley Citizens’ Counsel,
478 U.S. at 565; Blum 465 U.S. at 899; In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 690 F.3d 650, 666 (5th Cir.
2012) (“In these rare cases, the professionals may potentially receive an enhancement only after
transforming a carcass into a cheetah, soto [sic] speak thereby enlarging the pie that is shared by all
of the debtor’s creditors.”); Rose Pass Mines, Inc. v. Howard, 615 F.2d 1088, 1090–92 (5th Cir.
1980) (The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s award of a 16% fee enhancement because the
debtor’s attorney: (1) provided “excellent services” that produced an “unusually good result;” (2)
“evidenced a very high degree of expertise and competence in various areas of law;” and (3)
displayed “outstanding results” with a 100% dividend to all creditors.).
78. In re Pilgrim’s Pride, 690 F.3d at 662 (citing Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 554–56
(2010)).
79. In re Se. Banking Corp., 314 B.R. 250, 256–70 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2004).
80. Id. at 274–75.
81. See, e.g., ASARCO L.L.C. v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, P.C. (In re
ASARCO L.L.C.), 751 F.3d 291, 296 (5th Cir. 2014).
82. See generally Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 554–56 (2010).
83. Id.
84. See In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 690 F.3d 650, 653, 667 (5th Cir. 2012).
85. See id. at 653.
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Circuit held that “[t]he [Perdue] opinion relied solely on its prior fee-shifting
jurisprudence to support its holding” and the “opinion neither explicitly
touched on bankruptcy law nor indicated that the Supreme Court intended
Perdue to extend to non-fee-shifting cases,” and therefore the court,
“decline[d] to extend [Perdue] further.”86
Courts have continued to grant fee enhancements to debtors’ attorneys
after the Perdue decision.87 Courts have had no issues granting enhancements
to fee applications in bankruptcy cases, and there has been no mention of this
having a negative impact to the debtor’s estate, presumably because the
debtor’s estate would be significantly worse off had the debtor’s attorney not
performed such exceptional work. Although the estate is required to pay
higher attorneys’ fees, which in turn results in less money for the estate, the
Supreme Court allowed fee enhancements. Fee enhancements are a perfect
example of when Section 330 is ambiguous, but where courts continue to
allow for modifications to attorneys’ fees recovery.
D. COMPENSATION FOR THE DEFENSE OF A FEE APPLICATION
Until the decision in Baker Botts, courts split on whether attorneys’ fees
incurred during the defense of a fee application could be reimbursed under
Section 330(a). The vast majority of courts have allowed compensation for a
successful defense of a fee application.88 However, a minority of courts agree
with the Supreme Court majority in Baker Botts and do not permit
compensation for the defense of a fee application, claiming that the
compensation would benefit the law firm instead of the estate and that the
“American Rule” applies.89
In In re Smith, the Ninth Circuit determined that recovering fees for a
successful defense of a fee application was warranted.90 Courts continued to
gauge the grant or denial of fee-defense costs by the success of the attorney

86. Id. at 664–65.
87. See, e.g., In re Stelera Wireless, L.L.C., No 13-13267, 2014 WL 8850092 (Bankr. W.D.

Okla. 2014) (enhancing fees by $150,000); In re Mkt. Ctr. E. Retail Prop., 730 F.3d 1239, 1247
(10th Cir. 2013) (asserting that “the enhancement of attorney’s fees under Section 330 should be
restricted to the three limited exceptions that the Supreme Court identified in Perdue,” and allowed
otherwise.); In re Janata, 395 B.R. 496 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (allowing a $30,000 fee
enhancement); In re Nucentrix Broadband Networks, Inc., 314 B.R. 574 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 333 B.R. 114 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (allowing a $800,000 fee enhancement).
88. See, e.g., In re Manoa Fin. Co., 853 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1988); Boyd v. Engman, 404
B.R. 467, 483 (W.D. Mich. 2009); Nunley v. Jessee, 92 B.R. 152, 154 (W.D. Va. 1988); In re Hers
Cosmetics Corp., 114 B.R. 240, 244 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).
89. See, e.g., Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P. (In re Frazin), 413 B.R. 378, 402–03 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2009); In re JNS Aviation, L.L.C., No. 04-21055-RLJ-7, 2009 WL 80202, at *9 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009); In re Teraforce Tech. Corp., 347 B.R. 838, 866–67 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2006); In re DN Assocs., 165 B.R. 344, 354–55 (Bankr. D. Me. 1994).
90. See Smith v. Edwards & Hale, Ltd. (In re Smith), 317 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2002).
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in defending his or her fee application.91 As a result, courts have continued
to grant fees for a successful defense of a fee application.92 Likewise, courts
have reduced fees where attorneys failed to defend their fee applications.93
The policy justifications for allowing the recovery of fees for a successful
defense of a fee application are “similar policy arguments to those pre-dating
the 1994 Amendments—namely, the equal pay concept that not granting
defense costs would ‘dilute fee awards’ below compensation available to
attorneys generally.”94 The result is a “no-win” policy situation, “where a
bankruptcy attorney must file a publicly available fee application, a party in
interest objects to extract an unwarranted fee reduction, and the attorney faces
a defense that will cost more than the value of the reduction sought by the
objector.”95
A minority of courts prohibits recovery of costs sustained when
defending a fee application, regardless of the success of the defense. The
minority courts look at comparable non-bankruptcy litigation and how a
dispute for attorneys’ fees would be handled in such cases.96 The only
comparable non-bankruptcy counterpart is the American Rule, where “each
party must pay its own attorney’s fees and expenses.”97 The courts therefore
prevent such reimbursement, “[b]ecause skilled practitioners outside
bankruptcy would customarily receive no compensation for the additional
time spent litigating a fee dispute.”98
The minority courts’ comparison of bankruptcy fee application disputes
to the American Rule is defective. There is no non-bankruptcy counterpart to
Section 330(a)(1), where non-bankruptcy professionals are required to
submit fee applications for approval by courts and trustees, and have those
fees subjected to reduction.99 Additionally, Section 330(a)(6) acknowledges
that the task of preparing a fee application is not customary for other legal
91. Compare Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. Schilling, 252 B.R. 670, 675 (W.D. Ky. 2000), and In
re DN Assocs., 165 B.R. at 355 with Hennigan Bennett & Dorman LLP v. Goldin Assocs. L.L.C.
(In re Worldwide Direct Inc.), 334 B.R. 108, 111–12 (D. Del. 2005).
92. See, e.g., Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874, 877 (11th Cir. 1990);
Boyd v. Engman, 404 B.R. 467, 482–83 (W.D. Mich. 2009); In re Worldwide Direct Inc., 334 B.R.
at 111–12; In re Buckridge, 367 B.R. 191, 206 n.26 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007); In re Atwell, 148 B.R.
483, 491–92 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1993); In re Hutter Constr. Co., 126 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1991).
93. See Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 252 B.R. at 675; In re DN Assocs., 165 B.R at 355; In re Great
Sweats, Inc., 113 B.R. 240, 245–46 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re Watervliet Paper Co., 109 B.R.
733, 735 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989).
94. Timothy S. Springer, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t – Current Issues for
Professionals Seeking Compensation in Bankruptcy Cases Under 11 U.S.C. § 330, 87 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 525, 539 (2013); see In re Smith, 317 F.3d at 928.
95. Springer, supra note 94, at 539.
96. See id. at 540 (citing In re St. Rita’s Assocs. Private Placement, L.P., 260 B.R. 650, 652
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001)).
97. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010).
98. In re St. Rita’s Assocs., 260 B.R. at 652.
99. See In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 853–56 (3rd Cir. 1994).
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professionals, and requires bankruptcy professionals to be compensated for
it. Thus, the fee application is not comparable to what attorneys deal with
outside of bankruptcy and, moreover, places bankruptcy professionals at a
disadvantage.
Furthermore, if the defense of the fee application is successful and fees
are not awarded for such a defense, the result is a reduction in the fees the
attorney would have received had he or she not needed to defend the
application. Essentially, not reimbursing the fees results in a compensation
cut in bankruptcy attorneys’ fees.100 This is inherently contrary to the
legislative intent of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, where the
legislature wanted to enable equal compensation for bankruptcy attorneys.
Now attorneys face the possibility of entering frivolous and
disadvantageous litigation because they will not be reimbursed, even if their
fee application was proper. Particularly after the Baker Botts decision, there
is a lack of adequate safeguards to protect attorneys from frivolous feedefense litigation.101 As the example provided by Justice Breyer, discussed
supra, explained,102 the attorney is left to suffer for doing no wrong. The
debtor is allowed to challenge an attorney’s fee application at any point in
time103 and the attorney has to bear the expenses. Attorneys are at a
disadvantage after performing services for a debtor if their fee application is
challenged. A more viable option would be to follow the Fourth Circuit’s
holding in Shammas v. Focarino,104 where the court determined that “the
American Rule [ ] applies only where the award of attorneys fees turns on
whether a party seeking fees has prevailed to at least some degree.”105 The
Supreme Court in Baker Botts incorrectly used the American Rule as an
invalid justification to allow for such inequity.
II. THE AMERICAN RULE
The American Rule requires that each party pay its own attorneys’ fees,
unless there is an applicable exception.106 The origin of the American Rule is
100. See Smith v. Edwards & Hale, Ltd. (In re Smith), 317 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2002). The
court stated that a “[f]ailure to grant fees for successfully defending challenges to an authorized fee
application would dilute fee awards, in violation of Section 330(a), and this would reduce the
effective compensation of bankruptcy attorneys to levels below the compensation available to
attorneys generally.” Id. at 928 (citing In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1985)).
101. See generally Baker Botts L.L.P. v ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015) (where
the court did not allow recovery for fees incurred when defending a fee application).
102. See generally id. at 2170 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (for convenience: “Consider a bankruptcy
attorney who earns $50,000—a fee that reflects her hours, rates, and expertise—but is forced to
spend $20,000 defending her fee application against meritless objections.”).
103. Explained infra Part III.C (The only safeguard is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which
has little effect in protecting attorneys.); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
104. See generally Shammas v. Focarino, 784 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2015).
105. Id. at 223.
106. See generally John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 13 (1984).
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not entirely clear. However, it appears that the legislature wanted each party’s
legal expenses to reflect their decisions on how they wanted to litigate, and
to not make the other party liable for those decisions.107 The Supreme Court
gave two reasons for the American Rule: parties should not fear punishment
for bringing a lawsuit; and “litigating the question of what constitutes
reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial
administration.”108
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RULE
The American rule emerged in the early nineteenth century due to
attorneys pushing to recover fees from the defeated party, and as a result,
parties would pay more in the form of attorneys’ fees than for damages to the
prevailing party.109 There is much confusion regarding how or where the rule
was formed; yet it continues to exist. The reason for attorneys’ fees being so
disproportionate to damages was that juries considered attorneys’ fees when
they assessed damages,110 as they similarly do today.111 The American Rule’s
cross-Atlantic counterpart, the English Rule, requires the defeated party to
pay the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees.112 The English rule sought to
reduce frivolous litigation, because of the fear of covering the prevailing
party’s legal fees upon defeat of meritless claims.113 However, the English
Rule also risks eliminating meritorious lawsuits where the plaintiff fears
losing, because of the inability to pay the opposing party’s legal fees.114
Currently, there are fee-shifting statutes that “overrule” the American
Rule and allow reimbursement of legal fees to the prevailing party. 115
Another exception to the American Rule occurs when a party acts in bad
faith. “The threshold for invoking this [bad faith exception] is high, [] and
the Court should invoke it only when it finds that ‘a fraud has been practiced
upon it or that the very temple of justice has been defiled.’”116

107. See Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. 211, 230–31 (1872).
108. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (citing

Oelrichs 82 U.S. at 231).
109. See Leubsdorf, supra note 106, at 13.
110. See id. at 14.
111. See id.
112. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on
Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 327
(2013).
113. Id. at 335.
114. Id. at 335–36.
115. See, e.g., Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 203, 94 Stat. 2321 (1980)
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2012)).
116. Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P. (In re Frazin), 413 B.R. 378, 402–03 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2009) (quoting Boland Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Rihner, 41 F.3d 997, 1005 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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B. SHIFTS AWAY FROM THE AMERICAN RULE
“There are six general categories of exceptions to the ‘American rule:’
(1) Contracts; (2) Bad Faith; (3) Common Fund; (4) Substantial Benefit; (5)
Contempt; and (6) Fee-shifting statutes.”117 A key exception to the American
Rule is where a statute explicitly states that fees can be rewarded to the
prevailing party.118 One example is the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),
under which a party is allowed to recover its attorneys’ fees when the
government loses a case against the party and the government cannot show
that its position was substantially justified.119 It is important to note that the
EAJA allows recovery of fees when the party prevails against the
government, whether the party was the plaintiff or the defendant.120 This
demonstrates a shift from the typical pro-plaintiff approach of the American
Rule, towards the English rule under which the losing party pays the
attorneys’ fees. Congress, through the EAJA and other acts, has emphasized
a concern for relatively poor litigants prevailing against wealthy parties, such
as corporations or governments.121 Oddly enough, the EAJA was enacted to
incentivize businesses to sue the government.122 The government provided
funding to help poor parties prevail against rich parties, and as a result, shifted
away from the American Rule.123
C. BAD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE AMERICAN RULE
The bad faith exception “awards attorney fees against parties who litigate
in bad faith, for the obvious purpose of deterring illegitimate behavior in the
courtroom, and sometimes, outside it.”124 The Supreme Court implemented
the bad faith exception in Hall v. Cole125 and explained that when applying
the bad faith exception in certain cases, “the underlying rationale of ‘fee
shifting’ is, of course, punitive, and the essential element in triggering the
award of fees is therefore the existence of ‘bad faith’ on the part of the
unsuccessful litigant.”126 The bad faith exception only grants attorneys’ fees

117. David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and
Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 585
(2005).
118. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 260–61 (1975).
119. See Equal Access to Justice Act § 203.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. See Award of Attorney’s Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Judiciary Comm., 96th
Cong., 15–29, 56–58 (1980).
123. See Leubsdorf, supra note 106, at 32; see generally Phyllis A. Monroe, Financial Barriers
to Litigation: Attorney Fees and the Problem of Legal Access, 46 ALB. L. REV. 148, 154 (1981).
124. Leubsdorf, supra note 106, at 29.
125. See generally Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
126. Id. at 5.
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in exceptional cases and only when the “opponent has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”127
The majority opinion in Baker Botts explains that the bad faith exception
to the American Rule—or the exception’s bankruptcy counterpart, Rule 9011
of the Bankruptcy Code128—will work to exempt frivolous litigation against
the debtor’s attorney.129 The Court noted that “any concerns about the
possibility of frivolous objections to fee applications” will be protected by
court-imposed “sanctions for bad-faith litigation conduct, which may include
‘an order directing payment . . . of some or all of the reasonable attorneys’
fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.” 130
However, courts have been reluctant to apply the bad faith exception to the
American Rule.131
D. INEQUITY PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN RULE IN
BANKRUPTCY
The American Rule in the context of the defense of fee applications
would result in attorneys losing even if they successfully defended their fee
application. First and foremost, there is no comparable practice for nonbankruptcy professionals, because they do not have to submit fee
applications. Attorneys in other fields do not have to thoroughly explain their
work and have it reviewed by the United States Trustee and the court before
they can receive their compensation. Furthermore, there is no safeguard for
bankruptcy practitioners to avoid oppressive tactics by debtors, because of
courts’ rare use of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 and FRCP Rule 11.
By assuming that the American Rule is the non-bankruptcy counterpart
of reimbursing fee-defense expenses, the Supreme Court has once again left
bankruptcy professionals on an uneven playing field. The ultimate result:
attorneys pay the price even if they provide exceptional work. Therefore,
attorneys need some way to get their backs off the wall and make sure that
when a debtor challenges the fee application, it is done with the utmost good
faith and through a more complex process than simply filing a complaint in
a courtroom.

127. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Hall, 412 U.S.

at 5).

128. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011 (this rule is analogous to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP)); see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (enforcing that the litigation “is not being presented
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation.”).
129. See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2168 n.4 (2015).
130. Id. (quoting Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1198 (2014)).
131. See Leubsdorf, supra note 106, at 29; see generally Jacob Singer, Bad Faith Fee-Shifting in
Federal Courts: What Conduct Qualifies?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 701–13 (2010).
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III. BAKER BOTTS ANALYSIS
The Baker Botts decision overturned a strong majority of decisions
allowing compensation for successful fee-defense litigation.132 With the
ability to receive compensation for the successful defense of a fee
application, bankruptcy attorneys were not placed at a disadvantage if the
debtor filed a lawsuit against the attorney’s fee application. The courts and
United States Trustee already review fee applications;133 now, a legal
challenge by a debtor adds an additional obstacle in the way of a bankruptcy
attorney’s path to receiving compensation. The Baker Botts facts display a
scenario where attorneys are in dire need of safeguards to avoid frivolous
litigation.
A. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
ASARCO LLC filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2005.134
ASARCO was represented by Baker Botts LLP as primary counsel, and
Jordan, Hyden, Womble, Culbreth, & Holzer, PC as co-counsel.135 During
the bankruptcy case, Baker Botts pursued fraudulent transfer claims against
ASARCO’s parent company,136 for the transfer of a controlling interest in
Southern Copper Corporation (SCC).137 Baker Botts successfully obtained a
$6-$10 billion138 judgment against the parent, which was, at the time, “the
largest fraudulent transfer judgment in Chapter 11 history.”139 As a result, the
bankruptcy court awarded Baker Botts “approximately $120 million for their
work in the bankruptcy proceeding plus a $4.1 million enhancement for
exceptional performance. The court also awarded the firms over $5 million
for time spent litigating in defense of their fee applications.”140

132. See, e.g., Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co., 908 F.2d 874, 877 (11th Cir. 1990);
Boyd v. Engman, 404 B.R. 467, 482–83 (W.D. Mich. 2009); Hennigan Bennett & Dorman LLP v.
Goldin Assocs. L.L.C. (In re Worldwide Direct Inc.), 334 B.R. 108, 111–12 (D. Del. 2005); In re
Buckridge, 367 B.R. 191, 206 n.26 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007); In re 14605, Inc., No. 05-11910, 2007
WL 2745709, at *8–9 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 19, 2007); In re Atwell, 148 B.R. 483, 491–92 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1993); In re Hutter Constr. Co., 126 B.R. 1005, 1013 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1991).
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a) (2012).
134. Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2163.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 2163 (ASARCO L.L.C. is owned by ASARCO Incorporated, which is owned by
Americas Mining Corporation, which is in turn owned by Grupo Mexico (collectively, ASARCO’s
“Parent”)).
137. See id.
138. The range in the value of the judgment is due to the changing valuation of the SCC stock
and dividends that ASARCO received from its parent. When ASARCO initially transferred the
stock and dividends it was worth over $10 billion, but after the fraudulent transfer proceeding and
when ASARCO was returned the stock and dividends, they were valued at over $6 billion. See In
re ASARCO L.L.C., No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, at *5-7 (July 20, 2011).
139. Id.
140. Baker Botts L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. at 2163.
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“ASARCO is an integrated copper mining, smelting, and refining
company [that] entered Chapter 11 in 2005,”141 as a result of “billions of
dollars worth of environmental, asbestos, [tax,] and toxic tort liabilities.”142
“Creditors were expecting to recover only cents on the dollar.”143 The entire
board and the CEO of ASARCO resigned shortly after filing for bankruptcy.
“In February 2007, ASARCO filed suit against two of its parent entities,” and
“sought damages for fiduciary duty breaches and to avoid the fraudulent
transfer,” explained supra, for the sale of SCC.144 After Baker Botts
successfully avoided the transfer of SCC, ASARCO was left “with minimal
debt, $1.4 billion in cash, and liberated from its massive environmental,
asbestos and toxic tort liabilities.”145 The bankruptcy court described the
reorganization as “probably the most successful Chapter 11 of any magnitude
in the history of the Code.”146
On February 8, 2010, Baker Botts sought final approval of its fee
application, including “a 20 percent premium (about $22.6 million).”147 Until
the lawsuit by ASARCO, there was no objection to the final fee application.
After exiting bankruptcy, ASARCO was again under the control of its parent,
and objected to over $20 million in fees, including the $22.6 million fee
enhancement.148 The lawsuit required Baker Botts to produce every
document it had accumulated over the four-year bankruptcy proceeding,
“resulting in the production of 2,350 boxes of hard copy documents and
189GB of electronic data.”149
The bankruptcy court held that ASARCO’s claims were meritless. The
bankruptcy court concluded that it had the power to grant such fees under
Section 330(a) and determined that the fees were reasonable under the
lodestar method.150 The bankruptcy court noted that it “should reward rare
and exceptional work and should be tied to both the effort and the
outcome.”151 The court granted fees of only $5 million, instead of the
requested $8 million,152 without much explanation as to their reasoning. 153
Subsequently, ASARCO appealed to the district court, but this time around,
141. ASARCO, L.L.C. v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, P.C. (In re ASARCO
L.L.C.), 751 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2014).
142. Gregory W. Werkheiser, ASARCO and the High Cost of Getting Paid in the Fifth Circuit
(And Maybe Everywhere), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 2015 at 64.
143. In re ASARCO L.L.C., 2011 WL 2974957, at *4.
144. Werkheiser, supra note 142, at 12.
145. Id. at 12.
146. In re ASARCO L.L.C., 2011 WL 2974957, at *22.
147. Werkheiser, supra note 142, at 12.
148. See ASARCO, L.L.C. v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, P.C. (In re ASARCO
L.L.C.), 751 F.3d 291, 293–94 (5th Cir. 2014).
149. Id. at 293.
150. See In re ASARCO L.L.C., 2011 WL 2974957, at *17.
151. Id. at *37.
152. See Werkheiser, supra note 142, at 13.
153. See In re ASARCO L.L.C., 2011 WL 2974957, at *42.
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the court did not object to the fees in the application, and instead, objected to
the fee enhancements and the fees for defending the fee application.154 The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court.
Once again, ASARCO appealed to overturn the fee enhancements and
the fees for defending the fee application. The Fifth Circuit continued to
analyze the bankruptcy court’s ability to authorize fee enhancements and the
recovery of fees for defending fee applications under Section 330(a).155 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the fee enhancements in their entirety, using the
lodestar method and the argument presented in Pilgrim’s Pride, which
explicitly stated “that Perdue did not overrule this circuit’s bankruptcy
precedent authorizing fee enhancements . . . pursuant to Section 330(a).”156
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit considered the fraudulent transfer litigation as
a rare and exceptional circumstance, which should be considered as a “once
in a lifetime result.”157
The Fifth Circuit thoroughly analyzed the fees awarded for the defense
of the fee application. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that “Section 330(a)(3)
instructs the court to consider ‘all relevant factors’ concerning the
professional services rendered, including ‘whether their services were
necessary for the administration of, or beneficial . . . toward the completion
of a case . . .’ and ‘whether the compensation is reasonable’ based on charges
by comparable practitioners in non-bankruptcy cases.”158 However, the court
acknowledged that Section 330(a)(4) does not allow compensation for
services that were not reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate or
necessary to case administration.159 Further, the court acknowledged that
“[t]he primary beneficiary of a professional fee application, of course, is the
professional. While the debtor’s estate or its administration must have
benefitted from the services rendered, the debtor’s estate, and therefore
normally the creditors, bear the cost.”160 The court concluded that Baker
Botts could recover fees for defending its fee applications, suggesting that
“bankruptcy courts, practicing vigilance and sound case management, can
thwart punitive or excessively costly attacks on professional fee applications
. . . courts should not hesitate to implement the exception to the American
Rule that allows fee shifting where an adverse party has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”161

154. See id.
155. See ASARCO, L.L.C. v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, P.C. (In re ASARCO

L.L.C.), 751 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2014).
156. Id. at 296.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 299; see also 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (2012).
159. See ASARCO L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 299; see also 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4).
160. ASARCO L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 299; see also Grant v. George Schumann Tire & Battery Co.,
908 F.2d 874, 877 (11th Cir. 1990).
161. ASARCO L.L.C., 751 F.3d at 302.
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B. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS
ASARCO appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court and
the Court granted certiorari.162 The Supreme Court took the minority
approach towards the recovery of fees for defending fee applications. Justice
Thomas went into detail about the American Rule and stated that it was the
Court’s “basic point of reference.”163 The Court explicitly stated that it would
not deviate from the American Rule.164 Also, the Court noted that fee-shifting
statutes that displace the American Rule “tend to authorize the award of a
‘reasonable attorney’s fee,’ ‘fees,’ or ‘litigation costs,’ and usually refer to a
‘prevailing party’ in the context of an adversarial ‘action.’”165 The Court held
that Section 330(a)(1) does not act as a fee-shifting statute that would
displace the American Rule, because “the phrase ‘reasonable compensation
for actual, necessary services rendered’ neither specifically nor explicitly
authorizes courts to shift the costs of adversarial litigation from one side to
the other.”166
The Court rejected Baker Botts’s argument that “fee-defense litigation is
part of the ‘services rendered’ to the estate administrator under § 330(a)(1),”
and instead emphasized the analysis of the words “services rendered” in
Section 330(a)(1).167 The Court explained that the “word ‘services’ ordinarily
refers to ‘labor performed for another.’”168 Therefore, the phrase “necessarily
implies loyal and disinterested service in the interest of a client.”169 The Court
concluded that the term “services” “cannot be read to encompass adversarial
fee-defense litigation.”170 Further, the Court concluded that “[t]ime spent
litigating a fee application against the administrator of a bankruptcy estate
cannot be fairly described as ‘labor performed for’—let alone ‘disinterested
service to’—that administrator.”171
C. JUSTICE BREYER’S DISSENT
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, acknowledged
“that a professional’s defense of a fee application is not a ‘service’ within the
meaning of the Code,” but then supported the government’s argument,
presented in its amicus brief, “that compensation for fee-defense work ‘is
properly viewed as part of the compensation for the underlying services in
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See generally Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
Id. at 2164.
See id.
Id. at 2165.
Id. at 2166.
Id.
Id. at 2165 (quoting Services, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.

1934)).
169. Id. (quoting Woods v. City Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268 (1941)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
170. Id. at 2166.
171. Id.
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[a] bankruptcy proceeding.’”172 Justice Breyer explained that “[t]he
[Bankruptcy] Code provides that a ‘court shall consider the nature, the extent,
and the value of . . . services [rendered], taking into account all relevant
factors.’”173 Further, Justice Breyer asserted that “[t]he Bankruptcy Code
affords courts broad discretion to decide what constitutes ‘reasonable
compensation,’” and that “it may take into account the expenses that a
professional has incurred in defending his or her application for fees.”174
Moreover, the dissent asserted that “the extensive process through which a
bankruptcy professional defends his or her fees may be so burdensome that
additional fees are necessary in order to maintain comparability of
compensation [with non-bankruptcy professionals].”175 When a nonbankruptcy professional is subject to a fee-objection process, generally, only
their client can make that objection, and the process is “comparatively
simple, involves fewer parties in interest, and does not necessarily impose
litigation costs.”176 Therefore, it is “necessary to account for the relatively
burdensome fee-defense process required by the Bankruptcy Code.”177
Justice Breyer disputed the majority’s American Rule argument by
suggesting that Section 330 need not explicitly permit a court to award fees.
“To the extent that the majority intends to impose a requirement that a statute
must explicitly mention fee defense in order to provide compensation for that
work . . . [makes it] difficult to reconcile with the Court’s decision in Jean.”178
In Commissioner v. Jean,179 the Court held that “the Equal Access to Justice
Act authorizes compensation for fee-defense work,”180 despite the fact that
the statute did not explicitly state anything about fee-defense work.
Additionally, Justice Breyer argued that “the majority asserts that a fee
application, unlike fee defense, can be construed as a ‘service’ to the
bankruptcy estate,” but “[a] bill prepared by an attorney, or another
bankruptcy professional, is not a ‘service’ to the bankruptcy estate.”181
Regardless of the excellent points that Justice Breyer made in his dissent,
the majority’s opinion is still the law of the case. Attorneys need to be
protected against frivolous litigation and ensure that bankruptcy attorneys are
still compensated equally to attorneys in other fields of law.
172. Id. at 2169 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Kenneth N. Klee, Prof. Kenneth N. Klee on the
Supreme Court’s Holding in Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 2015 EMERGING ISSUES 7344
(2015).
173. Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2169 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3) (2012)).
174. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2171–72.
176. Id. at 2171.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160–66
(1990)).
179. See generally Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 496 U.S at 154.
180. Baker Botts L.L.P., 135 S. Ct. at 2171 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2172.
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D. IMPACT OF BAKER BOTTS
“For bankruptcy practitioners, the textual literalism of the Baker Botts
decision reaches a strikingly bad policy result, which incentivizes destructive
fee litigation designed to ‘hold up’ the professionals for discounts on fees
against the threat of continued litigation in which the estate professionals bear
only downside risk, costs, and delay.”182 The Fifth Circuit offered two
suggestions for professionals when deciding Baker Botts and proposed:
“They can anticipate the possibility of not being reimbursed for defending
fee applications by (1) adjusting upward their hourly rates and (2) more
thoroughly documenting their fee applications.183 A concern with those
suggestions is that the United States Trustee Program
has implemented revised standards requiring professionals in larger chapter
11 cases ‘to establish that the compensation sought is reasonable as
compared to the market measured by the billing practices of the applicant
and its peers for bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy engagements,’ and has a
stated policy to ‘ordinarily object to fees that are above the market rate for
comparable services.”184

Another concern is that requiring professionals to document fee applications
more thoroughly “will simply increase the cost to estates of fee application
preparation across the board” and is unlikely to “reduce objections, which . .
. are almost always tactically motivated, or eliminate costly proceedings to
resolve them.”185
The Baker Botts decision has serious repercussions for all attorneys in
the bankruptcy field, from large law firms like Baker Botts, to sole
practitioners that represent individuals in Chapter 12 and 13 cases. In In re
Huepenbecker,186 the court acknowledged how the recent Baker Botts
decision reduced the attorney’s fees from $250 per hour to approximately
$146 per hour—a whopping $104 per hour cut for all of the work the attorney
conducted as a result of defending his fee application.187 The court suggested
for other courts to invoke Rule 9011 more frequently; however, as discussed
earlier,188 there is no precedent for the effective use of Rule 9011 in
bankruptcy courts for this particular issue.189 The Baker Botts decision will
negatively affect the original intentions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, in that it may cause a lack of bankruptcy professionals to enter the field
182. Klee, supra note 172.
183. Werkheiser, supra note 142, at 65 (citing ASARCO, L.L.C. v. Jordan Hyden Womble

Culbreth & Holzer, P.C. (In re ASARCO L.L.C.), 751 F.3d 291, 301 n.7 (5th Cir. 2014)).
184. Id. at 66 (citing Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for Compensation and
Reimbursement of Expenses Filed under United States Code by Attorneys in Larger Chapter 11
Cases, 78 Fed. Reg. 36,248, 36,250 (June 17, 2013)).
185. Werkheiser, supra note 145, at 66.
186. See generally In re Huepenbecker, 546 B.R. 381 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2015).
187. See id. at 385.
188. See supra Part III.C & Part III.D.
189. See id.
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knowing that their fees have the potential to be reduced every time they
represent their client—even if successful.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO FIX THE INEQUITY
Baker Botts has already begun stirring commotion in bankruptcy courts.
Courts have differentiated cases in order to allow attorneys to recover fees
from defending fee applications. For example, in In re Hibbard,190 the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida allowed the attorney to
recover fees from fee-defense work and distinguished the case from Baker
Botts.191 Also, in SC Real Estate, LLC v. Acevedo,192 the U.S. District Court
for Northern District of Illinois found that Section 362 should not receive the
same treatment as Section 330, because it does not contain the terms “actual,
necessary services rendered” and “reasonable attorney’s fees,” and departs
from the American Rule, because Section 362(k) specifically mentions the
phrase “attorney’s fees.”193 Therefore, the district court granted the recovery
of legal fees the attorney incurred for defending his fee application.194
Seemingly, courts are attempting to fight against the unfair result of Baker
Botts by either distinguishing cases from the Supreme Court precedent or
threatening to sanction debtors who file in bad faith, although there has not
yet been an instance where a debtor was actually sanctioned.195
As mentioned earlier, neither Bankruptcy Rule 9011,196 nor FRCP Rule
11,197 are adequate safeguards against frivolous litigation, because courts
have not been known to enforce sanctions against bad faith litigation.198 It is
surprising that the Supreme Court even argued for such a safeguard when
they did not find any sort of bad faith in Baker Botts. Outrageously, in Baker
Botts, ASARCO’s parent company was the party advocating the lawsuit
against Baker Botts for excessive fees. If the court did not find ASARCO to
have conducted their lawsuit in bad faith—a case with the highest fraudulent
transfer recovery in history—then the standard is practically useless.199 This
190. See generally Herendeen v. Gen. Elec. Credit Union (In re Hibbard), No. 8:12-bk-10473KRM, 2015 WL 7251535 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2015).
191. See id. at *4 (“In [Baker Botts], the Supreme Court declined to award fees-on-fees under §
330(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. The FCCPA’s language explicitly provides for the recovery of
‘court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .’ Therefore, the Plaintiff [] also recover[ed]
reasonable fees for litigating the amount of the fee award.”).
192. See generally SC Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Acevedo, No. 15 C 1104, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
99066 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2015).
193. Id. at n.9.
194. See id.
195. See In re Huepenbecker, 546 B.R. 381, 385 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2015).
196. See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
197. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
198. See Leubsdorf, supra note 106, at 29; see generally Singer, supra note 131, at 701–13
(discussing the confusion in courts when applying the bad faith exception); see also Frazin v.
Haynes & Boone, L.L.P. (In re Frazin), 413 B.R. 378, 402–03 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009) (explaining
when courts should allow the bad faith exception).
199. See Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015).
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is especially so when considering that the fraudulent transfer was directed at
the parent company, and the parent company is the reason the lawsuit was
initiated, possibly as a form of revenge.200 If that is not frivolous, spiteful, or
bad faith litigation, then it is hard to imagine what would be. Unless the
Supreme Court outright overturns its decision, a unique solution must be
implemented to fix this inequity towards bankruptcy attorneys.
A. CONTRACT AROUND THE DECISION
One possible solution, according to Gregory Werkheiser, is to “seek
approval under § 328(a) at the time of retention of engagement terms
authorizing a professional to seek reimbursement of fees and expenses
incurred in successfully defending its fee application.”201
However, Werkheiser acknowledges that the solution is vulnerable and
courts are unlikely to allow attorneys to circumvent the Supreme Court’s
decision in Baker Botts by adding contractual language in their retainer
agreements. Furthermore, the idea was proposed in In re Boomerang Tube,
LLC, “where committee counsel sought to write exceptions to the American
Rule as applied to fee-defense litigation in their retention agreements.”202
However, “the [United States Trustee] objected to the inclusion of the fee
defense provisions,” and the court sustained the Trustee’s objection.203
A similar method—that would not require leaving Section 330—was
proposed by G. Christopher Meyer of Squire Patton Boggs to contract around
the issue presented by the Baker Botts decision.204 Meyer suggests including
express language about reimbursement in the engagement documents
between the attorney and the debtor.205 However, Meyer acknowledges that
there “cannot be a contracted exception to the American Rule when one did
not otherwise exist in the statute,” leaving no solution for attorneys. 206
Moreover, the Baker Botts decision has negatively affected bankruptcy
professionals other than attorneys as well.207
200. See Klee, supra note 172 (“The reorganized debtor’s extensive challenge to the Firms’ fees
has the appearance of a vindictive attempt to exact a token of revenge by the parent.”).
201. Werkheiser, supra note 142, at 66.
202. Mark D. Taylor, Baker & Botts: Efforts Continue to Define Its Scope, INSIDE COUNS. (Oct.
21, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/10/21/baker-botts-efforts-continue-to-define-its-sc
ope; see also In re Boomerang Tube, Inc., 548 B.R. 69, 71 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016).
203. In re Boomerang, 548 B.R. at 71.
204. See G. Christopher Meyer, Baker & Botts – Is the Second Shoe About to Drop?, ESQUIRE
GLOBAL CROSSINGS (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.esquireglobalcrossings.com/2015/09/baker-bottsis-the-second-shoe-about-to-drop/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=
Feed%3A+EsquireGlobalCrossings+%28eSQUIRE+Global+Crossings%29.
205. See id.
206. Id.
207. See In re Walker Land & Cattle, L.L.C., 535 B.R. 348, 358 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2015) (where
an accountant who filed a fee application failed to be reimbursed for legal expenses he incurred
when defending his fee application because the expenses were held to not be “reasonable and
necessary”).
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Currently, there is no solution, aside from the rare instances of bad faith
litigation, to how attorneys should handle fee applications. Bankruptcy
professionals are placed at a disadvantage as soon as the debtor decides to
litigate for a fee reduction.
B. LEGISLATIVE CHANGE TO SECTION 330
The simple, although lengthy, solution to the disparity created for
bankruptcy practitioners as a result of the Baker Botts decision would be to
amend Section 330. Congress has the opportunity to either amend current
sections of Section 330 or add an entirely new section in regards to defending
fee applications.
One suggestion made by Timothy Springer for how Congress can
incorporate a rule to reimburse attorneys for fee applications is to amend the
language of § 330(a)(6) to read: “Any compensation awarded for the
preparation or the defense of a fee application shall be based on the level and
skill reasonably required to prepare or to defend the application.”208 This
method would easily resolve the issue presented and seems like a likely
solution since the United States government expressed interest in the Baker
Botts case by submitting an amicus brief.209 However, it may take Congress
years to amend the Bankruptcy Code—if they decide to amend it at all—and
in the meanwhile, there are no safeguards in place.
C. PREREQUISITES BEFORE DISPUTING A FEE APPLICATION
Another viable solution may be to implement a standard that the debtor
must meet before he or she can dispute a fee application—essentially
challenging the idea at the outset, instead of waiting until it is too late. This
way, not only will the attorney be put in a position to carefully decide whether
to settle or litigate, but the debtor will also be put in that same position. Since
bankruptcy court opinions should only be overturned for an abuse of
discretion,210 the debtor should emphasize a good faith reason as to why the
fee application is still excessive—after review by the United States Trustee
and the court—therefore, putting the burden on the debtor.
Furthermore, bankruptcy courts can require debtors to first handle the
issue with the Trustee. Instead of immediately litigating, the debtor would
have to take the time to deal with the Trustee—since the Trustee initially
approved the fee application—and get approval to litigate. These
responsibilities are well in line with what the Trustee does on an ordinary
basis, as well as the Trustee’s mission statement: “[t]he mission of the United
208. Springer, supra note 94, at 556 (also explaining the unlikely possibility that if Congress
decided to adopt the opposite approach, then Congress can amend Section 330(a)(4) to explicitly
“disallow fees and expenses incurred in defending a fee application under § 330(a)(2)”).
209. See generally Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015).
210. See id.; Barron & Newburger, P.C. v. Texas Skyline, Ltd. (In re Woerner), 783 F.3d 266,
277 (5th Cir. 2015).
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States Trustee Program is to promote the integrity and efficiency of the
bankruptcy system for the benefit of all stakeholders – debtors, creditors, and
the public.”211 Therefore, the Trustee would act almost as an arbitrator prior
to allowing a debtor to sue their attorney in court.
Additionally, courts can also be more stringent on arguments against fee
applications at confirmation hearings. Although this allows judges much
discretion on the overall fee application, there may not be a better person to
justify a fee application than the trial judge who heard the case and dealt with
the parties first hand. Alternatively, judges can request for the parties to
arbitrate instead of litigate fee applications to lower costs.
As a result, with these limitations on the debtor prior to litigating against
a fee application, they may have to think whether they have enough resources
to carry the burden and prove to the Trustee and the courts that the fee
application is truly excessive. If nothing else, this may limit the total number
of fee application disputes due to the stringent standard.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy professionals must be protected to uphold Congress’s desire
to keep professionals in the bankruptcy field.212 Since the Baker Botts
decision, the playing field is no longer even, and debtors gain the upper hand
on attorneys—similar to before the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. Debtors can
litigate against their attorneys if they want to reduce their legal fees and
without effective safeguards, attorneys are left defenseless. By evening the
playing field once again, and placing a higher burden on plaintiffs to
challenge the integrity of attorneys’ fee applications, bankruptcy
professionals can continue to strive. Attorneys cannot sit around and hope
that Congress quickly passes legislation (if it passes legislation at all) fixing
the negative effects of Baker Botts, while they are forced to receive less
compensation if their clients sue them. In the interim, the U.S. Trustee
Offices can be more effective than the currently feeble safeguards of
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 or FRCP 11. The United States Trustee Offices can
create a barrier for frivolous litigation and become the first line of review on
appeal. Attorneys will no longer have to worry about an effective pay cut due
to incurring additional costs when defending their fee applications in court.
The higher standard will result in courts and Trustees having greater control
in the faith of fee applications and remove the current lose-lose situation for
bankruptcy attorneys.213

211. U.S. Trustee Program, About the Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., (May 12, 2016) http://www
.justice.gov/ust/about-program.
212. See H.R. REP. NO. 598, at 329–30 (1977); see also S. REP. NO. 989, at 39–40 (1978).
213. Even where an attorney is successful in defending his fee application, this success is limited
because he still suffers the costs of defending the application, which results in a loss for the attorney.
The only alternative is to settle with the debtor and discount the attorney fees. On the contrary, if
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the attorney is unsuccessful in defending his fee application, he will suffer both a reduction in fees
and litigation expenses.
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